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ABSTRACT
This paper addresses the less researched topic of internal displacement as
a human rights issue and analyzes the extent that the transnationalization
of human rights issues and the pressures from regional organizations
affected the rights of ethnic minorities, particularly internally displaced
ethnic groups. In order to shed light on how much state sovereignty on
sensitive internal matters can be challenged by regional organizations, the
paper examines Turkey’s efforts to join the European Community (through
membership in the Council of Europe and the European Union) in light of
its policies toward its internally displaced Kurdish population. Although
the analysis focuses on internal displacement as an issue within this field,
it also studies general human rights problems, such as minority rights,
cultural rights, and representation of minorities, within the context of
Turkey’s Kurdish Question.
I. INTRODUCTION
For about a decade, scholars have argued that the nation-state has lost
control over economic, political, social, and cultural issues within its
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borders. Although global civic organizations and transnational social
movements have been more active in the issues affecting global citizens,
regional organizations recently have increased pressure toward nation-
states with regard to issues that the latter traditionally consider as matters of
domestic concern. One such domain is in the area of human rights.
The transnationalization of human rights norms and movements has
indirectly resulted in international organizations increasing their monitoring
of states’ policies toward Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), the conflicts
producing IDPs, and efforts resolving the conflict and resettling IDPs. This
has proven especially true in cases in which the majority of the IDPs
constitute an ethnic minority within that state. But to what extent has the
transnationalization of human rights issues and the pressures from regional
organizations affected the rights of ethnic minorities, particularly when they
are internally displaced ethnic groups? To answer this question, an examina-
tion of Turkey’s efforts to join the European Community (through member to
the Council of Europe and the European Union) in light of its policies
toward its internally displaced Kurdish population proves illuminating. This
case in particular clearly illustrates the degree to which states still exercise
a certain degree of control over human rights issues with regard to their own
ethnic minorities and to the internally displaced, contrary to the assertions
of those proclaiming the decline of the state’s capacity to do so.
This article proposes that the issue of internal displacement can and
should be studied within the human rights plane. A review of the literature
on the role of international and regional organization in forcing states to
comply with human rights standards concerning these issues focuses the
discussion on how states breach human rights standards before, during, and
after internal displacement. In focusing on internal displacement, the
argument is not that it is a qualitatively different human rights problem but
that like any other human rights issue that the state claims sovereignty over,
it is a matter that is difficult for states to reach consensus with international
organizations. As with any other part of the world, what makes the
consensus between Turkey and the European Community harder to reach is
the local importance given to the issue.
By using Turkey as a case study, this article makes the argument that
although increasing pressures of regional and international organizations on
human rights issues challenge state sovereignty more and more, states still
treat certain issues such as internal displacement as their internal matters
and discount such coercions. Yet, in some cases, these pressures prove
effective in the sense that they make states accept certain rights and agree to
give remedies to those affected, even though these rights may not be fully
protected in practice. From a pessimistic point of view, accepting certain
human rights, at least on paper, might seem still far away from the full
exercise of these rights. An optimist might, on the other hand, evaluate the
2005 Transnationalization of Human Rights Norms 971
acceptance of certain rights as a step forward to that end. Taking a European
organization, the Council of Europe, Pamela Jordan addresses a similar
issue by examining the characteristics that may lead a state to adopt her
policies consistent with the norms promoted by the organization.1 Similar to
Jordan’s work, this article argues that “membership has its privileges” in
persuading members to conform to certain standards of human rights, but
the success of the persuasion depends on whether the state is already a
member or is waiting to become one as well as the nature of the human
rights issue at stake and the local importance given to it.
This article discusses the degree to which certain international and
regional mechanisms work for the improvement of human rights, and how
the steps taken by these organizations should be utilized in making states
comply with human rights issues by using Turkey as a case study. Although
the analysis focuses on internal displacement as an issue within the field of
human rights, it also studies general human rights problems, such as
minority rights, cultural rights, and representation of minorities, within the
context of Turkey’s Kurdish Question.
II. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
After the end of the Cold War, nation-states started to feel the effects of
international organizations, regional organizations, and the global political
community more powerfully than ever before. Human rights issues came to
the fore after the fall of the communist regimes. With violent ethnic conflicts
occurring all over the world, the international community initiated efforts to
prevent conflict before its appearance as well as worked for post-conflict
reconstruction. These efforts concentrated on pressuring nation-states on
such issues as human rights practices, cultural liberties, and other similar
issues.
While it may appear at first that states have begun to relinquish some of
their authority to international bodies, this argument does not stand up
under closer scrutiny. For governments with a stronger preference for
autonomy, accession to international organizations is much more difficult2;
thus, some states have limited their compliance with international human
rights conventions and treaties. In her analysis of the twenty-one former
Soviet bloc countries, Jordan, following Virginie Guiraudon’s work, argues
1. Pamela A. Jordan, Does Membership Have Its Privileges?: Entrance into the Council of
Europe and Compliance with Human Rights Norms, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 660 (2003).
2. ROSEMARY FOOT, RIGHTS BEYOND BORDERS: THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY AND THE STRUGGLE OVER HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CHINA 2 (2000); Jordan, supra note 1.
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that the nation-state is the primary actor in determining the extent to which
this sovereignty may be diminished by external pressure to conform to
human rights norms.3 States sometimes overcome this limitation either by
ignoring international pressures or by referring to international law that
prevents international intervention to domestic matters. In particular, states
cite Article (2)7 of the United Nations Charter, which prevents international
intervention in the domestic affairs of states.4 Through these states’ invoca-
tion of the UN Charter, organizations experience difficulties in detecting
violations of human rights: “Those who herald the end of the nation-state all
too often assume the erosion of state power in the face of globalizing
pressures and fail to recognize the enduring capacity of the state apparatus
to shape the direction of domestic and international politics.”5 Despite
international pressure, territoriality is still the defining element of a state’s
sovereignty and power on any particular issue. “Blocking factors” such as
popular nationalism, secessionist movements, territorial integrity, or social
value structures may affect a nation-state’s commitment and adherence to
human rights practices.6 The international community, for example, is
currently frustrated in modifying the human rights practices of the strong
Chinese government. Viewing such cases as examples of the international
community’s failure to challenge state sovereignty on bad human rights
practices, one can cheer the long-lasting paradigm of the realists that the
states are the ultimate sovereigns within their own territories and that
transnational forces do not have the means and power to meaningfully
challenge states on human rights practices.7
There is, thankfully, an increasing belief that the international advocacy
channel, transnational social movements, and regional and international
organizations, through different channels, oppose states even in matters
once considered internal. A body of recent literature now exists on how
noncompliance prevention mechanisms can be effective in forcing states in
commitment to international human rights standards.8 International and
3. Jordan, supra note 1, at 660.
4. The article states that “[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to
settlement under the present Charter.” U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, ¶ 7, signed 26 June 1945,
59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153 (entered into force 24 Oct. 1945).
5. DAVID HELD, POLITICAL THEORY TODAY 212 (2001).
6. FOOT, supra note 2, at 13.
7. See also KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979); F.H. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY (2d
ed. 1986); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 3
(5th ed. 1973) (explaining the realist paradigm).
8. See, e.g., THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE (Thomas
Risse et al. eds., 1999); MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998); Kathryn Sikkink, Human Rights,
Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America, 47 INT’L ORG. 437 (1993).
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local pressure from NGOs, persuasion, shaming, and isolation can motivate
states to comply with human rights understandings and practice.9 Kathryn
Sikkink argues that state practices can also be transformed through material
benefits such as trade benefits and military or economic aid, but these
benefits may not be effective if the leaders are unwilling to take the
normative messages.10 There is also an increasing belief that access to
membership in international and regional organizations can motivate states
to comply with human rights standards.11 At the practical level, there have
recently been attempts to reconstruct the traditional understanding of state
sovereignty. The Report of the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty emphasizes the need to recharacterize the concept of
sovereignty from sovereignty to control to sovereignty as responsibility. The
introduction of sovereignty as responsibility incurs extra responsibility on
the state toward its citizens as well as legitimizes the practice of interna-
tional bodies in checking on the status quo of these responsibilities. The
Commission’s report on 18 December 2001 elaborates on the threefold
significance of this shift: a) state responsibility to protect the safety and lives
of its citizens; b) state responsibility toward its citizens and the international
community through the UN; and c) state accountability for the acts of
commission and omission. The report also emphasizes the ever-increasing
impact of international human rights norms and the concept of human
security on the reconstruction of the sovereignty concept.12
However, the question remains to what extent international mecha-
nisms, norms, and reconceptualizations are or have been influential in
forcing states to comply, especially in areas that they consider sensitive or
untouchable? Within the context of this article’s focus, the use of the state
sovereignty argument means that IDPs are vulnerable as states often claim
that such situations are internal matters. The remainder of this article will be
dedicated to the issue of conflict-induced internal displacement as a human
rights issue, the need for transnational mechanisms to address the issue, and
the application of this discussion to Turkey’s actions and policies toward the
Kurdish population. Turkey provides a good case study because it presents
both the issue of a strong state with a long-lasting ethnic problem and
internal displacement and the issue of international pressures challenging
this strong state fit the theoretical picture. The last section of the article
recommends improving Turkey’s acceptance of human rights agreements
and examines whether Turkey’s eagerness to join the European Community
9. See FOOT, supra note 2, at 10; KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 8.
10. Sikkink, supra note 8, at 437.
11. Jordan, supra note 1, at 660.
12. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT:
REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (2001).
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has actually contributed to improving the country’s human rights practices
concerning the internally displaced Kurds.
III. CONFLICT-INDUCED INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT:
AN INTERNATIONAL CONCERN OR AN INTERNAL MATTER?
Internal displacements can happen due to economic, political, and environ-
mental reasons in both developing and developed states. “Displacement in
Africa is primarily a result of failure of the economy, while in the Middle
East it is due to the failure of the polity, and in the United States, of
administration.”13 However, conflict-induced internal displacement has
been most common in the developing world during the process of state-
formation or as a result of efforts to keep nation-states homogenous. Aristide
Zolberg et al. argues, as reported by Howard Adelman, “whereas all ages
have witnessed people forced to move from their homes, refugees [includ-
ing IDPs] are a creation of the modern world. They are not just forced
migrants but are part and parcel of the development of the nation-state.”14 In
most cases, internal displacement is a result of conflict between different
ethnic groups or between governments and ethnic, racial, linguistic, or
religious minority groups. Conflict-induced internal displacements caused
by the failure of the polity often are linked directly to the state’s active
involvement in a conflict (i.e., the state choosing a side in the conflict
through its policies), its inability to perform its functions by failing to isolate
itself from incompatible interests, or its failure to take seriously or to even
comprehend the nature of the conflict.
Intrastate conflicts can produce either refugees or IDPs, with the
distinction resting upon whether the migrant crosses an international border.
Recently, the number of IDPs has surpassed the number of conventional
refugees by a ratio of two-to-one.15 In the 1990s, the number of IDPs started
to increase dramatically worldwide. By 1997, the number reached “more
than 20 million in at least thirty-five countries.”16 Recent statistics indicate
that some 22 to 25 million have been internally displaced because of
internal strife, armed conflict, and communal tensions.17
13. SETENEY SHAMI, POPULATION DISPLACEMENT AND RESETTLEMENT: DEVELOPMENT AND CONFLICT IN THE
MIDDLE EAST 2 (1994).
14. See Howard Adelman, Modernity, Globalization, Refugees and Displacement, in
REFUGEES: PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXPERIENCE OF FORCED MIGRATION 83, 89 (Alastair Ager ed., 1999).
15. The Global IDP Project, available at www.db.idpproject.org/global_overview.htm#9.
16. THE FORSAKEN PEOPLE: CASE STUDIES OF THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED 1 (Roberta Cohen & Francis M.
Deng eds., 1998).
17. Erin D. Mooney, Principles of Protection for Internally Displaced Persons, 38 INT’L
MIGRATION 82, 82 (2000).
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In most cases both forced refugees and IDPs are results of coercion and
compulsion; thus, the mechanisms protecting the two should be the same.18
However, policies protecting the two differ greatly because the agencies in
charge of the governing policies differ. In the case of refugees, international
agencies19 and the host state care for the refugee problems; for IDPs, the
cases are considered “internal matters” and the state in which the internal
displacement has occurred dictates the policies. An important distinction to
note here is that in the case of internal displacement, international refugee
laws protecting refugees against discrimination by the hosting states do not
apply because internally displaced persons remain within the borders of
their home states. When governments insist that they can handle issues by
their own means, internally displaced persons are deprived of any interna-
tional material assistance.20 Such circumstances often affect migrants’
physical security and material well-being.
Until about fifteen years ago, the issues of internally displaced people
were not even discussed in the international arena. The United Nations
implemented protection for IDPs in 1992, and in 1997 the appointed
special representative of the UN Secretary-General firmly brought the issue
to the international human rights agenda. According to the modified United
Nations definition, the internally displaced are the persons or groups of
persons
who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of
habitual residence, in particular, as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of,
armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or
natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally
recognized state border.21
18. Luke T. Lee, Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees: Toward a Legal Synthesis?, 9
J. REFUGEE STUD. 27 (1996).
19. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol are the
basic international documents that gave the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) an international legal basis to protect refugees by establishing the signatory
nations’ obligations for the protection and rights of refugees. CONVENTION RELATING TO THE
STATUS OF REFUGEES, adopted 28 Jul. 1951, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/108 (1951), 189 U.N.T.S.
150 (entered into force 22 Apr. 1954), reprinted in 3 WESTON III.G.4.; PROTOCOL RELATING
TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, done 31 Jan. 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force 4 Oct. 1967) (entered into force for U.S. 1 Nov. 1968).
20. Cohen argues that several cases exist in which governments discourage international
involvement, and these IDPs remain beyond the range of international activities. The
governments of these countries either do not acknowledge that there is a problem (i.e.,
Algeria, Myanmar, India) or insist that they can handle the issue themselves (i.e.,
Turkey, India). See Roberta Cohen, Hard Cases: Internal Displacement in Turkey, Burma
and Algeria, 6 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 25, 25–26 (1999).
21. MASSES IN FLIGHT: THE GLOBAL CRISIS OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 18 (Roberta Cohen & Francis M.
Deng eds., 1998).
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Thus, the definition includes both those forced and those felt obliged to
leave their homelands. The category includes people affected by natural or
human-made disasters as well as those fleeing conflicts and violence. The
definition recognizes groups as well as individuals as victims of this
experience, a distinction which is crucial to understanding the role of the
state when the source of forced mobility is the conflict between groups,
when the state is an incapable actor, or when IDPs result from state-group
conflicts.
Although the introduction and definition of the concept through an
international document is a significant step in the international governance
of the issue, the United Nations document contains mostly guiding, rather
than binding, principles. On the other hand, the existence of such
documents can and may force states to comply with international norms,
albeit only to a certain extent. For example, in 1995, the Colombian
government created the System of Comprehensive Assistance to the Popula-
tion Displaced by Violence and recognized forced displacement as a public
policy issue. With the introduction of Law No. 387 on 18 July 1997, this
System set out the concrete steps and the specific responsibilities of the
entities involved. However, recent reports by international organizations
still underscore the need for greater protection and assistance to Colombia’s
IDPs.22 The reluctance of many states to have themselves bound by
international documents that address IDPs creates certain problems, par-
ticularly when the internal displacement issue is analyzed on the human
rights plane. As noted earlier, human rights practices on internal matters
have only recently begun to be governed by guidelines and compliance
mechanisms. In the international environment, the most frequently used
compliance mechanism for the problems of civil war and ethnic conflict is
sanctions. In recent years, the most practiced sanctions are economic ones,
and, increasingly, the international community is resorting to isolation
policies to encourage state compliance by adopting soft policies, such as
public “shaming” and threatening to prohibit access to international
organizations.
In most cases, these compliance mechanisms may prove effective in
some regards. However, because IDPs are usually the product of civil wars
or ethnic conflict, sanctions are useless if they have already been imposed
in response to a civil war or ethnic conflict issue. Of course, states still fall
back on the internal affairs argument with regard to sanctions over IDPs.
Human rights violations cut across all phases of internal displacement
because during and after internal displacement, physical insecurity and
22. The Global IDP Project, Country Information Page: Colombia, available at www.db.
idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wCountries/Colombia.
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material deprivation can take place.23 Areas in which internal displacement
and human rights issues converge include the tragedy of being caught in the
crossfire of armed conflict during the flight; inadequate shelter, food, and
medical care; denial of access to education and opportunities in the place of
destination; and life and security problems that may emerge in return and
resettlement. According to human rights law, states have to “ensure the
survival, well-being, and dignity of all persons subject to their territorial
jurisdiction.”24 Mission reports prepared by the Representative of the
Secretary-General discuss “human rights of the displaced with regard to
equality and nondiscrimination, life and personal security, personal liberty,
subsistence, freedom of movement, personal documentation, property and
land, family and community, education and employment, asylum in third
countries, and return to normal life.”25 Following these arguments and
practices, some responsibilities of states emerge when internal displacement
is made part of the human rights plane: a) establishment of prevention
mechanisms for conflict-induced displacements; b) the need to provide
assistance during and after the emergency; c) protection of individual rights
(the right to life, the right to property, etc.) during the forced movement; d)
safe and voluntary return of the IDPs; and e) the overall improvement and
strengthening of state institutions to guarantee and protect these rights.
During and after internal displacement, states are also obliged to protect
certain rights, such as the right to life, the prohibition of torture and
degrading treatment or punishment, the right to liberty and security, the
right to a fair and public hearing, the rights to land and resource access, and
the rights to freedom of movement and residence. If internal displacement is
a consequence of an armed conflict, states carry the responsibility to protect
their citizens26 as well as their rights to freedom of movement and
residence.27 However, in most circumstances, the challenges to state
23. Mooney, supra note 17 at 82.
24. Id.
25. Maria Stavropoulou, Displacement and Human Rights: Reflections on UN Practice, 20
HUM. RTS. Q. 515, 531 (1998).
26. Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 Aug. 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force 21 Oct. 1950) (entered into force for
U.S. 2 Feb. 1956); Protocol (II) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II) 8 June 1977, art 13, ¶1, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (entered into force 7 Dec.
1978), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977).
27. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 27 Nov. 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. (Resolutions, pt. 1) at 71, art. 13, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948),
reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT’L L. 127 (Supp. 1949); International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, art. 12, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force
23 Mar. 1976).
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sovereignty have been possible only in humanitarian relief; however, cases
exist in which states did not allow humanitarian aid to reach the affected
populations because the issue was believed to be one of internal affairs.
To shed some light on how much the international pressures and
noncompliance mechanisms work in changing state compliance, the case
of the Kurds in Turkey can be used to highlight the salient issues and themes
involved.
IV. TURKEY AND KURDISH INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT
The Kurds have never existed as an independent political community28 and
thus have been under the rule of others throughout their history—including
the Sassanian, Safavid, and Ottoman Empires and the Turkish Republic. The
basic documents and international treaties, such as the Treaty of Lausanne
in 1923,29 that shaped the legal foundations of the Turkish state only
registered non-Muslim groups—Greeks, Armenians, and Jews—as officially
recognized minorities. Over the course of time, resentment grew among the
Kurds in Turkey who had rebelled against the Republic with the larger aim
of carving out a separate Kurdistan within the territorial boundaries of the
Turkish Republic. During the first years of the Republic, several Kurdish
uprisings occurred. Of the eighteen rebellions that broke out between 1924
and 1938, seventeen were in Eastern Anatolia and sixteen involved Kurds.30
From the late 1930s through the late 1950s, Kurdish opposition to the
regime subsided, but the pattern shifted in the late 1980s as a result of the
emergence of the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party,
PKK). The PKK launched its first attack on the Turkish state in 1984. In 1987,
following the PKK’s attacks, the government declared emergency rule in
thirteen Kurdish-populated cities. Since then, the war between Kurdish
insurgents and Turkish military forces has claimed 27,000 lives.31
Regional and international organizations have gained some influence in
the aftermath of the cold war with the increase in intra- rather than inter-
state disputes. Violent ethnic conflicts broke out in rapid succession,
28. The only exception is the short-lived, December 1945 Mahabad Republic in today’s
Iran. The Republic ceased to exist when the Soviet forces and support, which helped the
foundation of the Republic, were withdrawn in December 1946. See DAVID MCDOWALL,
A MODERN HISTORY OF THE KURDS (1997).
29. Treaty of Peace with Turkey, 24 Jul. 1923, Turk.-Allies [Gr. Brit., Fr., Italy, Japan,
Greece, Rom., & Serb-Croat-Slovene State], 28 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter, Treaty of
Lausanne].
30. KEMAL KIRIS*ÇI & GARETH WINROW, THE KURDISH QUESTION AND TURKEY: AN EXAMPLE OF A TRANS-STATE
ETHNIC CONFLICT 100 (Frank Cass ed., 1997).
31. Kemal Kiris*çi, Turkey,  in INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE: A GLOBAL SURVEY (Janie Hampton ed.,
1998).
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prompting the international community to expand its role from post-conflict
reconstruction to conflict prevention as well. Scholars and activists are
nearly unanimous in the belief that Europe represents the best examples of
regional organizations (specifically, the Council of Europe, the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the European Union) providing
agreed upon norms for implementing human rights standards and for
monitoring state compliance.32 Scholars also point out the increasing
engagement of regional and international organizations in monitoring the
conditions of internally displaced people.33 These standards, compliance
issues, and monitoring mechanisms have been the source of some tension
between the European Community’s political bodies and Turkey. In recent
decades, Turkey garnered the attention of the international community with
respect to human rights issues because of several issues, among which we
can include its treatment of the minority Kurdish population. World
attention focused on the Kurds at the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991
and continued throughout the 1990s with increasing levels of forced
migration from the Kurdish populated regions of eastern and southeastern
Anatolia.
The conflict-induced internal displacement of the Kurds in the 1990s
was the result of a) the evacuation of villages by the military, allowed by the
1987 emergency rule;34 b) the PKK’s pressure against the villagers who do
not support the PKK to abandon their villages; and c) insecurity resulting
from being caught between the PKK and Turkish security forces.35 As a result
of this conflict, many Kurds left their villages and moved to the nearest
urban centers. A significant proportion of the population moved in the last
fifteen years,36 mostly to the periphery of nearby cities as well as to
32. See, e.g., PREVENTING CONFLICT IN THE POST-COMMUNIST WORLD: MOBILIZING INTERNATIONAL AND
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1, 7 (Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes eds., 1996);
CONNIE PECK, SUSTAINABLE PEACE: THE ROLE OF THE UN AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN PREVENTING
CONFLICT 98 (1998); Connie Peck, The Role of Regional Organizations in Preventing and
Resolving Conflict, in TURBULENT PEACE: THE CHALLENGES OF MANAGING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
(Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 2001); Terence Hopmann, The Role of Multilateral
Organizations in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe 2 (2002) (occasional paper, Sabanci University, Program on
Conflict Analysis and Resolution).
33. See Mooney, supra note 17, at 87; Stavropoulou, supra note 25.
34. In 1987, the Prime Minister Turgut Özal established a system of emergency rule (OHAL)
with a regional governor for most of the southeast. It aimed to control the region with
strict state measures. The system was also supported by the village guard system of
thousands of civilian, pro-government Kurds to supplement the state’s control in the
region. See MICHAEL M. GUNTER, THE KURDS AND THE FUTURE OF TURKEY 61 (1997).
35. Kiris *çi, supra note 31, at 198.
36. Southeastern Anatolia is characterized as a traditional agricultural region. Beginning in
the late 1960s, the region started to lose its population to the big metropolises as a result
of increasing dominance of market mechanisms in the region. The rate of out-migration
increased especially after the 1980s due to the conflict between the Kurdish insurgents
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shantytowns surrounding big cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and
Adana.37 It is estimated that between 2–3 million people have been
internally displaced.38 According to a report prepared by a committee of the
Turkish Grand National Assembly, in six Eastern and Southeastern Anatolian
cities that were under the State of Emergency legislation (Diyarbakır,
Hakkari, Siirt, S*ırnak, Tunceli, and Van) and five nearby cities (Batman,
Bingöl, Bitlis, Mardin, and Mus*), 820 villages and 2,345 hamlets were
evacuated, and 378,335 people were forced to leave.39
Internally displaced Kurds migrated to big cities such as Istanbul,
Ankara, Izmit, and Izmir in Western Anatolia and Adana and Mersin in the
Mediterranean region, but there was also a village-to-city migration within
the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolian regions. Many internally displaced
Kurds did not know about the well-being of their lands, homes, and
belongings during their long periods of displacement due to the decrease in
security conditions in the region. In the case of those whose villages were
evacuated, access to the village was prohibited.40
Some domestic and international organizations have argued that human
rights have been abused during this displacement process, which later
became the focus of the international community’s criticism of Turkey’s
human rights practices. These organizations claimed that Turkey violated
and the Turkish military. However, the latest developments to boost economic growth
through a series of irrigation and development projects such as the GAP (Southeastern
Anatolia Project) helped to attract in-migration toward the urban centers, and the
population growth in the urban centers began to increase again. See Bahattin Akπit
et al., Population Movements in Southeastern Anatolia: Some Findings of an Empirical
Research in 1993, 14 NEW PERSPECTIVES ON TURKEY 53 (1996). Thus, the region is losing its
rural population to the big cities in Western Anatolia as a result of the conflict between
the Kurdish insurgents and the Turkish military on the one hand, and administrative-
urban centers of the region are attracting people on the other hand, increasing the urban
population of the region.
37. Human Rights Association, Habitat II Alternatif Rapor: Es *it,Õzgür, Ayry;msy ;z Yerleπim
Hakky; (Habitat II Alternative Report: Right to Equal, Free, Indiscriminate Residence)
(undated).
38. Id.
39. Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Report of the Committee of the National Assembly
to Inquire the Problems of the Citizens, Who Migrated as a result of Evacuations in
Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, and To Determine Solutions, Commission Report
No. 10/25 (9 Feb. 1997).
40. After the 1999 capture of Õcalan, the leader of the PKK, the government initiated a
return program. The previous habitants in some villages of Bingõl, Bitlis, Tunceli,
Batman, and Diyarbaky ;r, and Van are allowed to return to their villages if they sign a
petition form, and indicate that their villages were evacuated because of terrorism.
However, these villages require a reconstruction and public facilities to be able to
welcome the returnees. Although there are still some minor problems faced by these
returnees, international reporters such as those assigned by the Council of Europe report
positive developments in the region. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly,
Humanitarian Situation of the Displaced Kurdish Population in Turkey, Doc No. 9391
(22 Mar. 2002).
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the rights of the Kurdish IDPs not only in the areas of the rights to life and
property but also by the state’s inability to provide food, temporary housing,
and medical care.41
The Kurds were displaced into large cities and faced difficult living
conditions mainly because they had to leave the region with their families
without any support from those who remained behind. In contrast to
voluntary migration, in which one individual usually first establishes a living
and brings the family to the city, these IDPs had no jobs or homes waiting
for them and their families in the cities.42 With a substantial number of
Kurdish migrants in big cities, the social and economic gap between the
Kurds and “the others” became more obvious, with the former possessing
fewer socioeconomic assets (e.g., financial capital and education) and less
access to social and economic resources, in part due to linguistic barriers.43
Forced migration revealed this larger picture of inequalities existing in the
society. Among the difficulties the IDPs encountered in big cities, the most
significant was employment. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the range of
opportunities for occupational and social mobility for migrants, once high
in the 1960s and 1970s,44 shrank as unemployment rates increased and
income differentials widened.45 Combined with the resource access prob-
lem, many IDPs who lacked jobs, even through their informal networks,
faced economic difficulties in their new environments. Also, the Kurdish
IDPs faced not only economic marginalization but also social isolation. In
terms of settlement, for example, the displaced Kurds were forced to choose
different patterns from those who moved to Istanbul earlier. Most Kurdish
IDPs who came to Istanbul in the 1990s settled on the peripheries of
Istanbul either because of the lower rents or the opportunity to build an
41. See Turkey’s Failed Policy to Aid the Forcibly Displaced in the Southeast, 8 HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (June 1996), available at www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Turkey2.htm; Global
IDP Project, Country Information Page: Turkey, available at www.db.idpproject.org/
Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/wCountries/Turkey; IMMIGRANTS’ ASSOCIATION FOR SOCIAL
COOPERATION AND CULTURE (GOC-DER), THE RESEARCH AND SOLUTION REPORT ON THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC
AND SOCIO-CULTURAL CONDITIONS OF THE KURDISH CITIZENS LIVING IN THE TURKISH REPUBLIC WHO ARE
FORCIBLY DISPLACED DUE TO ARMED-CONFLICT AND TENSION POLITICS: THE PROBLEMS THEY ENCOUNTERED
DUE TO MIGRATION AND THEIR TENDENCIES TO RETURN BACK TO THE VILLAGES (2002).
42. SEMA ERDER, KENTSEL GERILIM 151 (1997).
43. Some Kurdish IDPs, especially women, do not speak Turkish, which affects their job
opportunities in the city. According to a survey done by GOC-DER, forced migration
particularly affected “the citizens of Turkish Republic, whose native language is
Kurdish,” and there is a significant number of Kurdish IDPs in big Western Anatolian
cities who only speak Kurdish (25.4 percent of the 2139 respondents); GOC-DER, supra
note 41.
44. MICHAEL DANIELSON & RUS *EN KELES*, THE POLITICS OF RAPID URBANIZATION. THE GOVERNMENT AND
GROWTH IN MODERN TURKEY (1984).
45. Ays *e Ayata, The Emergence of Identity Politics in Turkey, 17 NEW PERSPECTIVES ON TURKEY
59, 59–73 (1997).
Vol. 27982 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
informal dwelling without the authorities’ taking notice. Such isolation can
have significant consequences, as social exclusion “is not necessarily
equated with economic exclusion, although this form is often the cause of a
wider suffering and deprivation.”46 Hence, social exclusion can be multidi-
mensional, with consequences in cultural, economic, and political domains.47
These findings demonstrate that internally displaced Kurds require
special assistance from the state because of the decreased quality of their
living conditions as a result of the conflict in their home regions and that the
state should facilitate the necessary conditions for their return. According to
the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Prin-
ciple 4, “children, especially unaccompanied minors, expectant mothers,
mothers with young children, female heads of household, persons with
disabilities and elderly persons should be entitled to special protection.”48
Nevertheless, the Turkish state has been either unwilling or unable to assist
these people. The state’s position on this, however, recently began to
change with Turkey’s increased willingness to comply with the norms of the
European Community. Although Turkey’s path toward European integration
started earlier with membership in the Council of Europe, more significant
steps were taken after Turkey’s candidacy for European Union membership
was accepted in 1999. Both cases will be analyzed further, as they affect the
policies of the Turkish state toward its Kurds.
V. TURKEY’S LONG PATH TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
The 1990s marked a watershed for Turkey in terms of integrating into the
global community. Turkey’s efforts to become a member of the European
Union (EU) had an important effect on its policies toward its minorities in
general and with the Kurds specifically. However, long before these efforts,
Turkey signed several regional and international treaties to protect human
rights. There are several international documents to which Turkey is a
signatory, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,49 the
European Convention on Human Rights,50 and the United Nations Covenant
46. Ali Madanipour, Social Exclusion and Space, in SOCIAL EXCLUSION IN EUROPEAN CITIES 76 (Ali
Madanipour et al. eds., 1998).
47. Id. at 77.
48. See Mooney, supra note 17, at 90.
49. See U.N. CHARTER, signed 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153
(entered into force 24 Oct. 1945).
50. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, opened for signature 4 Nov. 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5
(entered into force 3 Sept. 1953) [hereinafter ECHR].
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on Civil and Political Rights.51 Aside from these treaties, Turkey has also
bound itself with the obligations to be part of the Council of Europe.52 These
treaties and regional organizations, to some extent, have influenced the
Turkish state’s policies toward the Kurds and have influenced indirectly the
country’s policies concerning internal displacement from Kurdish-populated
regions.
In fact, the path Turkey had taken has been increasingly taken by others
since the end of the Cold War, when former Communist bloc countries
wanted to be part of the liberal democratic Europe and its institutions.
Turkey’s path draws parallels to theirs in terms of fulfilling the obligations to
become an EU member, but it diverges slightly because it has been willing
to be part of the process for a much longer period. According to Jordan, the
degree to which states comply with and learn the norms diffused by these
institutions varies from one state to another. She differentiates three
categories of compliance: high, which includes those members that are not
under the investigation by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe (PACE) or the Committee of Ministers, have generally complied with
the Council’s recommendation, and appear to actively promote democratic
practice; medium, which includes members that have shown progress
toward fulfilling their obligations and commitments to the Council of
Europe, but not enough to qualify them for the high-compliance group; and
low, which includes members that are being monitored by the PACE
because they failed to fulfill key obligations and commitments in their
accession agreements. In Jordan’s categories, Turkey, until recently, fit into
the low compliance group because of the Council of Minister’s monitor-
ing.53 However, it is safe to argue that Turkey’s recent moves in overcoming
its human rights problems through fulfilling the obligations to become an
EU member have switched it to one of the upper categories. In the next
section, a history of these improvements will be presented.
51. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A.
Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976).
Even though the Covenant was prepared in 1966, Turkey signed it on 15 August 2000
together with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Even
though the draft was sent to the Assembly for ratification it was later withdrawn. See
Tary ;k Ziya Ekinci, Avrupa Birliƒi’nde Azy;nly ;klary ;n Korunmasi Sorunu, Türkiye ve
Kürtler (2001).
52. The Council of Europe is an intergovernmental organization that aims to protect human
rights, the rule of law, and pluralist democracy and to promote democratic stability in
Europe. It has forty-five member states, which, by agreement, bounded themselves to
respect the principle of the rule of law, and to guarantee human rights and fundamental
freedoms to everyone under their jurisdictions. For further information about the
objectives, see the Council of Europe webpage, available at www.coe.int [hereinafter
Council of Europe’s webpage].
53. Jordan, supra note 1, at 663.
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A. The Council of Europe
Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe in 1949. Its membership
to the Council of Europe led to the Turkish state’s recognition of the
protection of human rights, at least on paper. Of the important documents
Turkey has signed as a member of the Council of Europe, the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms54 was one of
the most significant. The signatories aim collectively to enforce the rights
stated in the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The Convention formed three institutions, all of which had supranational
powers that Turkey accepted: a) the European Commission of Human Rights
(1954)55; b) the European Court of Human Rights (1959)56; and c) the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Among these bodies, the
first two have recently been important to some Kurds who claimed that their
rights are violated by the Turkish state. These institutions also serve as
important international actors in monitoring Turkey’s policies and actions
concerning the rights of the internally displaced Kurds. Overall, these
institutions are concerned with Turkey’s human rights practices. However, a
significant portion of these concerns up until now regarded Turkey’s
treatment of Kurds in general and the Kurdish IDPs to a certain extent.
According to international law, states have to protect the rights of their
citizens. If they do not comply with this rule, citizens have the right to resort
to the international agencies to secure their rights. In early 1987, Turkey
ratified Article 25 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,57 which provides the right of individual
54. ECHR, supra note 50.
55. Until November 1998, this international body examined the admissibility of all
individual or state applications against a member state in accordance with the European
Convention on Human Rights. It expressed an opinion on the violation alleged in
applications found to be admissible in cases in which no friendly settlement is reached.
See Council of Europe’s webpage, supra note 52.
56. Based in Strasbourg, this is the only truly judicial organ established by the European
Convention on Human Rights. It is composed of forty-three judges (as of April 2003) and
ensures, in the last instance, that contracting states observe their obligations under the
Convention. Since November 1998, the Court has operated on a full-time basis. Id.
Turkey ratified the ECHR on 18 May 1954 but recognized the right of individual
petition on 28 Jan. 1987. See Council of Europe, Turkey and the Council of Europe,
available at www.coe.int/T/e/Com/about_coe/member_states/e_tu.asp#Topofpage.
57. Article 25 of the Convention states that “The Commission may receive petitions . . . from
any person, nongovernmental organization or group of individuals claiming to be the
victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the
Convention . . . . those of the High Contracting Parties who have made such a
declaration [to recognize individual petition] undertake not to hinder in any way the
effective exercise of this right.” European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 25, opened for signature 4 Nov. 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5 (entered into force 3 Sept. 1953), available at
www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html.
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petition to the European Commission of Human Rights after exhausting
domestic resources. In the Turkish context, the human rights abuses
garnered the attention of international human rights agencies, mostly in the
case of Kurdish Members of Parliament58 and internal displacements.
Several NGOs requested compensation from the Turkish state on behalf of
those affected by village evacuations. Kurds who brought cases in Turkish
courts for possible compensation from the state failed to get any money.
These cases were subsequently taken to the European Commission of
Human Rights. There have been approximately 1,500 applications to the
European Court of Human Rights related to the breach of several articles of
the European Convention on Human Rights.59
Most of these were cases in violation of the European Convention on
Human Rights, Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition of torture and
degrading treatment or punishment), 5 (right to liberty and security), 6 (right
to fair and public hearing), 8 (right to respect private and family life), 13
(right to effective remedy), 14 (prohibition of discrimination), and 18
(restrictions under convention shall only be applied for prescribed purposes).60
Sikkink argues that domestic NGOs play a significant role in breaking
off state sovereignty by publicizing human rights abuses to the international
community, and these NGOs then pressure states to correct them.61 In the
Turkish case, the European institutions became more important for those
58. On 16 June 1994, the Constitutional court banned the pro-Kurdish DEP. Its thirteen
deputies were stripped of parliamentary immunity, and seven who did not flee abroad
were charged with treason and put in jail. The MPs Türk, Dicle, Doƒan, Sadak, and
Zana were given thirteen-year sentences, and Saky;k received a three-year sentence,
based on the claim that they were members of an armed group. The trial and charges
against the MPs attracted a great deal of attention from the world’s political leaders and
media. Many representatives of international nongovernmental organizations came to
Turkey to support the MPs. The European Parliament and Amnesty International asked
for their release. Yet, the decision was clear: the MPs were found guilty.
Exhausting all possible solutions in domestic law, the case was brought to the
European Court in 1995 (Case of Sadak and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 27100/95, Eur.
Ct. H.R.). Finally, on 17 July 2001, the case was resolved and the Court decided that the
State Security Court in Ankara, which tried the MPs was not an “independent and
impartial” tribunal and that it violated the principle of fair trial under Article 6 of the
European Court of Human Rights. Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) the Court awarded
$25,000 to each applicant (namely the four MPs) for damages.
After the abolishment of State Security Courts in June 2004, these PMs were released.
Interestingly, the release came the same day of first the Kurdish broadcast on a Turkish
TV channel. European institutions welcomed these two developments.
59. See specifically application numbers 8803–8811/02 and 8815–8819/02. See 2004
Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, COM(2004)656 final at 50,
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf.
60. See ECHR, supra note 50, arts. 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 13, 14, 18. For a detailed analysis of these
and other cases, see the Kurdish Human Rights Project’s webpage, available at
www.khrp.org.
61. Sikkink, supra note 8, at 414.
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Kurds who thought that their rights were violated by the Turkish state. In
particular, several Kurdish associations and foundations, founded in the
1990s to defend the rights of these Kurds in European courts, applied to
these institutions more often after the 1990s, when forced evacuations led
them to leave their homes involuntarily. Toplumsal Hukuk Aras*tırmaları
Vakfı (The Foundation for Social Jurisprudence Researchers, TOHAV) is one
of these foundations dealing with issues such as Turkey’s alleged human
rights violations against Kurdish individuals. TOHAV provides lawyers,
opens cases in Turkish courts, and takes cases to the European Court of
Human Rights if all avenues in domestic courts have been exhausted.
The European Court of Justice has also been influential in affecting the
possible implementation of the new law on compensation of the losses
arising from the conflict in the region. A recent decision of the Court
signaled to the Turkish state that the burden of proof in cases in which an
IDP makes a claim for his or her property without any proof of property lies
with the state.62 Against the claims of the state that there is no proof of
ownership, the Court decided that the applicants “had unchallenged rights
over the common lands in the village and earned their living from breeding
livestock and tree-felling. Those economic resources and the revenue the
applicants derived from them qualified as ‘possessions’ for the purposes of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.”63
Grassroots associations from the Kurdish-populated regions, identity-
based Kurdish associations, and human rights organizations also play a
crucial role in bringing such cases to the attention of international
organizations. Some locally based associations representing these regions,
for example, assist their members in directing them to other associations or
to law firms that can find them lawyers to take their cases to the European
Court of Human Rights. Whether through NGOs or individual applications,
the bodies of the Council of Europe began to influence somewhat the issue
of Kurdish internal displacement. In the late 1990s, the vocabulary of the
European Court entered into the lives of those who believed that their rights
had been violated.
The Council of Europe’s exertion of influence also has been evidenced
through its visits to the Kurdish-populated regions and reports on the
“humanitarian situation of the displaced Kurdish population in Turkey.”64
62. Dilek Kurban, Legal and Practical Evaluation of Turkey’s Problem of Internal Displace-
ment (Jan. 2005) (unpublished working paper presented in TESEV’s Working Group on
Internal Displacement), citing Dog¨an and Others v. Turkey, App. Nos. 8803–8811/02,
8813/03, 8815–8819/02 (2004) (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
63. Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Chamber Judgment in the Case of
Dog ¨an and Others v. Turkey (29 Jun. 2004), available at www.coe.int/T/D/
Kommunikation_und_politische_Forschung/Presse_und_Online_Info/Presseinfos/P2004/
20040629-GH-Dogan.asp.
64. Council of Europe, supra note 39.
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Through its recommendations on the Iraqi Kurdish refugees65 and Kurdish
IDPs,66 the Council of Europe tried to improve the lives of the Kurds affected
by forced migration. Its most recent report indicates “positive developments
in the humanitarian situation of the displaced Kurdish population”67 and
asks for “additional international financial assistance with a view to
fostering economic development in the southeastern part of Turkey”68 to
help resettlement of the internally displaced.
B. Turkey and the European Union
Although less directly but more powerfully, the EU69 has exercised some
influence in Turkey’s policies toward the internally displaced Kurds, specifi-
cally toward the cultural component of the conflict and resettlement
problem. For years, Turkey sought membership in the EU; finally, on 11
December 1999, the European Council of the EU, in the Helsinki Summit of
December 1999, decided to include Turkey in its enlargement list by
elevating its status from applicant to candidate.70 Turkey had to undertake
some political and economic reforms, however, for those accession negotia-
tions to begin. Since December 1999, Turkey has paid careful attention to its
policies that most concern the EU. This attention, and the subsequent
changes, brought about a partial success in the last EU Summit, held on 16
65. See Council of Europe, Recommendation 1150 (1991) on the situation of the Iraqi
Kurdish population and other persecuted minorities.
66. See Council of Europe, Recommendation 1377 (1998) Humanitarian situation of the
Kurdish refugees and displaced persons in South-Eastern Turkey and Northern Iraq.
67. Council of Europe, supra note 39, at 1.
68. Id.
69. The following information came from the European Union webpage available at
www.europa.eu.int (hereafter, the EU webpage).
70. Officially, Turkey’s efforts to join the European Community (EC) goes back to 31 July
1959 when it applied to EEC membership immediately after Greece. On 12 September
1963, it signed an Association Agreement with the EC, the Ankara Treaty, to become an
associate member. Its association was expanded in 1970, and it applied for full
membership on 14 April 1987. The protocol in 1970 laid down basic objectives in
Turkey’s relations with the EU, such as the continuous and balanced strengthening of
trade and economic relations and the establishment, in three phases, of a customs
union.
Turkey’s application for full EC membership was turned down in 1989 with the claim
that the country was not ready to become a member. Instead the Commission suggested
the operation of the Association Agreement and the realization of a customs union,
which became a reality on 6 March 1995 as the Customs Union Agreement (CUA) and
put in effect in 1996. See Meltem Müftüler-Baç The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the
European Union, 34 MIDDLE EASTERN STUD. 240, 241 (1998).
Although the establishment of a customs union between Turkey and the EU
awakened hopes on the side of Turkey, on 12 December 1997 during its Luxembourg
Summit, the European Council decided not to include Turkey in its enlargement
process, after which Turkey reacted severely. Id.
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and 17 December 2004, during which the European Council called on the
Commission to present a proposal for a framework for negotiations, which
are expected to start on 3 October 2005 and to last at least a decade.
The conditions for starting the EU accession negotiation process (acquis
communautarire) with candidate states are set forth in the Copenhagen
Criteria, adopted in the Copenhagen European Council Meeting of June
1993.71 According to the Copenhagen Criteria, candidate states must fulfill
several standards and criteria.72 Among them were political criteria indi-
rectly affecting the issues related to Turkey’s internal displacement policies
and its approach to the Kurdish Question. Of the political standards, respect
for the principle of the rule of law and for minority rights serves as a crucial
part of the basis for compliance. In the December 1997 Luxembourg
Meeting, the European Council asked the European Commission to prepare
progress reports on the candidate countries.73 The Commission Progress
Reports of 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001 presented Turkey’s adherence to the
political conditions of the Copenhagen Criteria as an important criterion to
start the accession negotiations.74
The European Commission’s 1997 opinions on the eligibility of each
candidate clearly state that “observance of human rights is part of the acquis
communautaire.”75 Within the context of the Kurdish Question, the EU was
most concerned about human rights abuses, cultural rights of minorities,
and the removal of the State of Emergency in eastern and southeastern
Anatolia. Overall the Commission paid special attention to the structural
problems in Turkish democracy. These problems were so central to the EU’s
decisions that when Turkey was included to the EU’s enlargement candi-
dacy list in 1999, the Council’s decisions emphasized the need for the
commitment to the political conditions:
71. European Council in Copenhagen (21–22 Jun. 1993), Conclusions of the Presidency, SN
180/1/93 Rev 1, available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/
72921.pdf.
Also, through the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in May 1999, the
political criteria defined at Copenhagen have been essentially enshrined as a constitu-
tional principle in the Treaty on European Union. See Consolidated Version of the
Treaty on European Union, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/
C_2002325EN.000501.html.
72. These standards include: 1) political standards: stable institutions governing democracy,
the rule of law, and respect for human rights; 2) economic standards: the existence of a
functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure; 3)
compatibility standards: the ability to take on the obligations of membership including
adherence to the principles of political, economic, and monetary union. See Müftüler-
Bac, supra note 70, at 241.
73. European Council in Luxemburg (12–13 Dec. 1997), Presidency Conclusions, Doc/97/
24, available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/032a0008.htm.
74. European Commission, Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress
Toward Accession (1998, 1999, 2000, & 2001).
75. European Union, Agenda 2000.
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Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like other Candidate states,
will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms.
This will include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing
toward fulfilling the political criteria with particular reference to the issue of
human rights.76
In some cases, the pressures on Turkey were effective even before these
developments. For example, the acceptance of the Customs Union on 13
December 1995 took place after many debates,77 and the European
Parliament78 stated that the Turkish authorities should continue the neces-
sary process of reforming the constitution and that the financial aid enabled
through the Customs Union could be frozen if human rights deteriorated.79
More specifically, the European Parliament asked Turkey to progress toward
solving its Kurdish problem, along with other issues such as changing the
1982 Constitution80 and Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law81 as well as
improving the positions of the MPs from the pro-Kurdish DEP and fostering
better human rights practices.82 The ratification process was nearly rejected
by the European Parliament because Turkey did not note any improvement
in reforming laws on matters relating to human rights and the “Kurdish
problem.”83 However, some articles in the constitution were modified to
broaden political participation, such as Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law,84
which was softened in October 1995.85 However, no improvement was
made concerning the case of the Kurdish MPs. These improvements were
satisfactory enough for the European Parliament to ratify the Customs Union
in 1996.86 Yet, paradoxically, following these events, on 17 January 1996,
76. European Council in Helsinki (10–11 Dec. 1999), Presidency Conclusions. Cf. MELTEM
MÜFTÜLER-BAÇ, ENLARGING THE EUROPEAN UNION: WHERE DOES TURKEY STAND? 18 (2002).
77. European Commission, Competition, VI Decision No 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association
Council of 22 December 1995 on implementing the final phase of the Customs Union
(CE-TR 106/1/95).
78. The role of the European Parliament became a stronger one with the Article O of the
Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The Article stated that “Any European State may apply to
become a Member of the Union. It shall address its application to the Council, which
shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of
the European Parliament, which shall act by an absolute majority of its component
members (emphasis added) available at www.europarl.eu.int.
79. See generally TURKISH DAILY NEWS (14 Dec. 1995).
80. TURK. CONST. of 1982, Official Gazette, Law No. 2709 (9 Nov. 1982).
81. Anti-Terror Law, No. 3713, art. 8 (Turk.). See also Republic of Turkey, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, available at www.mfa.gov.tr.
82. See Müftüler-Bac, supra note 70, at 248–50.
83. See Council of Europe’s webpage; GUNTER, supra note 33; William Hale & Gamze Avci,
Turkey and the European Union: The Long Road to Membership, in TURKEY IN WORLD
POLITICS: AN EMERGING MULTIREGIONAL POWER (Bary Rubin & Kemal Kiris*çi eds., 2001).
84. Anti-Terror Law, No. 3713, art. 8 (Turk.).
85. Law No. 4126 (Turk.).
86. Decision No. 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 22 December 1995 on
implementing the final phase of the Customs Union (96/142/EC).
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the European Parliament decided to award Leyla Zana, the only female
Kurdish MP in prison, the Sakharov Prize87 as a warning to Turkey.88 The
European Parliament’s decision to warn Turkey about its practices and its
vote in 1997 to force the Turkish government to grant general amnesty to
and to start negotiations for a possible political solution with all Kurdish
organizations, including the PKK,89 frustrated the Turkish state. Following
these events, at the Luxembourg Summit of the European Council in
December 1997, EU officials did not include Turkey in their plans for future
enlargement and stressed the need for economic and political reforms as
well as for the improvement of Turkish-Greek relations as conditions for
strengthening the EU-Turkish relationship. One of the political conditions
mentioned by the EU was the improvement of human rights practices and of
the treatment of its Kurdish minority, a condition to which the Turkish state
reacted harshly.90
Following the Helsinki Summit of December 1999, which granted
Turkey candidate status as of November 2000, the EU issued an Accession
Partnership Document (ADP) with a list of issues that Turkey had to address.
These issues dealt mainly with minority rights, torture, the role of military in
politics, and the Cyprus issue. Turkey adopted its National Programme for
Adoption of the Acquis in March 2001, which resulted in the enactment of
eighty-nine new laws and amendments to ninety-four others in order to,
inter alia, “improve Turkey’s human rights and bring the country’s inflation-
prone economy up to European standards.”91
As part of harmonizing its laws with the European norms in the process
for the adoption of the acquis, Turkey signed the 1969 UN Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, albeit with a
reservation to Article 22 to the effect that cases involving Turkey can only be
referred to the International Court of Justice with the state’s consent,92 and
87. The Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, named after Soviet scientist and dissident
Andrei Sakharov, was established in December 1985 by the European Parliament as a
means to honor individuals or organizations that had dedicated their lives to the defense
of human rights and freedom. It is awarded annually on or around 10 December, the
day on which the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights was signed.
88. IHSAN D. DAG ¨ı, INSAN HAKLARY ;: KÜRESEL SIYASET VE TÜRKIYE 130 (2001).
89. Id.
90. Birol A. Yes *ilada, The Worsening of EU-Turkey Relations, 19 SAIS REV. 1 (1999).
91. Philip Martin et al., Best Practice Options: Turkey, 40 INT’L MIGRATION 123 (2002).
92. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
adopted 21 Dec. 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force 4 Jan. 1969), reprinted in
5 I.L.M. 352 (1966). Article 22 reads: “Any dispute between two or more States Parties
with respect to the interpretation or application of this Convention, which is not settled
by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention, shall, at
the request of any of the parties to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of
Justice for decision, unless the disputants agree to another mode of settlement.”
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the European Agreement Relating to Persons Participating in Proceedings of
the European Court of Human Rights.93 Following the Council’s decision for
Strengthening the Accession Strategy for Turkey, on 26 March 2003, the
government modified its National Programme with the intent to sign the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,94 its optional protocol,
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;95
to ratify Protocol No. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights
regarding the abolition of the capital punishment;96 and to comply with the
judgments of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, particularly the judgments of the European
Court of Human Rights (Section II of the Convention).97 In fact, the European
Commission criticized Turkey’s failure to execute judgments of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, referring specifically to ninety cases in
which Turkey did not ensure the payment ordered by the Court and eighteen
cases in which the authorities did not erase the consequences of criminal
convictions for violating the Convention in the exercise of freedom of
expression. The European Commission also warned Turkey to respond to
the Committee of Ministers’ demands regarding the situation of the Kurdish
ex-MPs mentioned previously.
On 13 December 2002, the Copenhagen European Council Summit left
Turkey as the only applicant country with no specific date to start the
93. European Agreement Relating to Persons Participating in Proceedings of the European
Court of Human Rights, ETS No. 067, entered into force 17 Apr. 1971, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/067.htm.
94. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res.
2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976).
95. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 Dec.
1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 Jan. 1976).
96. Protocol No. 6 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, E.T.S. 114, entered into force 1 Mar. 1985, available at
www1.umn.edu/humanrts/euro/z25prot6.html.
Even though since 1984 there have been no executions exercised in Turkey, the
Turkish Penal Code, until recently, provided for the death penalty for nine different
offenses: crimes against the territorial integrity of the state, collaboration with a state at
war with Turkey, espionage, attempts to overthrow the existing constitutional system by
force, armed rebellion against the government, preventing the cabinet from performing
its functions, inciting the people to revolt and to kill one another, attempting to
assassinate the President, and aggravated homicide. See Criminal Law No. 765 (1 Mar.
1926) (Turk.). The GNAT passed the resolution to abolish capital punishment and to
replace it with life imprisonment without remission on 3 August 2002, and signed
Protocol 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. See Law No. 5218 (14 July
2004) (Turk.).
97. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to
the Council, Strengthening the Accession Strategy for Turkey, Brussels 2003. See also
www.abhaber.com.
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accession negotiations. However, the Summit resolved that if the European
Council in December 2004 decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen
Criteria, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commis-
sion, the EU would open accession negotiations with Turkey “without
delay.”98 Following the summit, the government in power accelerated its
efforts to pass the necessary laws to harmonize its domestic laws with the
European standards, which resulted in a partial success in the 16–17
December 2004 European Union meeting in Brussels.99
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, recent political developments,
especially initiated through new laws and constitutional amendments, have
the potential to bear positive developments for Kurds in general and the
Kurdish IDPs in particular. Because the conflict between the Turkish army
and the PKK seems to have diminished, or at least has decreased in intensity
since the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, the new legislation might
offer better opportunities for the Kurdish IDPs. One such item of legislation
that indirectly affects the lives of Kurds in general covers linguistic rights. As
mentioned earlier, linguistic barriers have been a problem for Kurdish IDPs.
The Grand National Assembly of Turkey has accepted broadcasting in other
mother tongues besides Turkish and has eased bans on languages other than
Turkish.100 For the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic, the
98. Copenhagen European Council (12–13 Dec. 2002), Presidency Conclusions, Doc. No.
15917/02, available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf.
99. Brussels European Council (16–17 Dec. 2004), Presidency Conclusions, Doc. No.
16238/1/04 Rev. 1, available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/
ec/83201.pdf.
100. The National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (adopted on 8 Mar. 2001) used the
phrase “teaching in native language” rather than education in native language as
foreseen by the accession partnership. Even though the new article allows learning
Kurdish (and other mother tongues and accents) in private courses and broadcasting in
Kurdish, the state will still be able to exercise strict control in such areas. For example,
the Kurdish TV programs will only be broadcasted by public television and will be
limited in content. Article 4 (as amended by the Law No. 4756 on 21 May 2002 and by
Law No. 4771 on 9 Aug. 2002) of the Law of the Radio and Television Supreme Council
states that
there may be broadcasts in the different languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish
citizens in their daily lives. Such broadcasts shall not contradict the fundamental principles of the
Turkish Republic enshrined in the Constitution and the indivisible integrity of the state with its
territory and nation. The principles and procedures for these broadcasts and the supervision of
these broadcasts shall be determined through a regulation to be issued by the Supreme Board.
See Radio and Television Supreme Council, available at www.rtuk.org.tr.
The content of the private courses offering Kurdish lessons will also be determined by
the state. The most serious limitation to these courses was brought by limiting who the
attendees could be: those under the age of eighteen, those who did not finish their eight
years primary education, and those who do not know Turkish cannot attend these
courses. Also prohibited is attending the courses with garments that have yellow, red,
and green together, representing the banner of the Kurdish armed group, the PKK. See
SABAH (18 Sept. 2002).
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languages and cultures of groups outside those defined by the Lausanne
Treaty101 have found a public voice, however limited.
Following these decisions, the first private Kurdish schools opened their
doors to students in April 2004 in the two Kurdish-populated cities in the
regions affected by the conflict.102 In June 2004, the same day that the first
Kurdish broadcast appeared on Turkish state television, the Appeals Court
ordered the release of the four Kurdish MPs, a decision highly welcomed by
human rights NGOs in Turkey and high officials within the EU.103 However,
the Court of Cassation of 14 July 2004 decided for re-trial of the four.
In June 2004, a state-owned television channel broadcast the first TV
program in five of the non-Turkish languages spoken in Turkey, two of which
are dialects of Kurdish. However, even though the new article allows
learning Kurdish (and other mother tongues and accents) in private courses
and broadcasting in Kurdish, the state will still be able to exercise strict
control in such areas. For example, Kurdish TV programs will only be
broadcasted by public television and will be limited in content.104 Accord-
ing to many Kurdish NGOs, even though these legislative reforms have
made steps towards granting rights to Kurds, such rights are far from being
fully realized due to the restrictive regulations.105
Of course, the clearest direct legislative effect of Turkey’s eagerness to
join the EU came with the gradual removal of the State of Emergency rule in
thirteen Kurdish-populated provinces in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia.
However, the national NGOs dealing with the return still note problems in
return migration to the villages that have been evacuated by the security
forces, especially violations undertaken by village guards.106
101. The Lausanne Treaty signed between the occupying allies and Turkey in 1923, which
shaped the legal foundations of the new Turkish Republic, registered only non-Muslim
groups such as Greeks, Armenians, and Jews as recognized minorities.
102. There are two regions affected by the conflict, but the schools opened in two cities in
one of the regions affected by the conflict. In Turkey, region is an administrative unit
(like a city ).
103. Press Release, Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, Welcomes the
Release of Leyla Zana by Turkish Authorities (9 Jun. 2004), Doc. No. S0162/04,
available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/declarations/80900.pdf.
104. Law of the Radio and Television Supreme Council, art. 4, as amended by Law No. 4756
(21 May 2002) and Law No. 4771 (9 August 2002), available at www.rtuk.org.tr.
105. Presentation to OSCE: Kurds as a National Minority in Turkey, KURDISH HUMAN RIGHTS
PROJECT NEWSLINE, Winter 2004, at 3, available at www.khrp.org/newsline/newsline28/
newsline28.pdf.
106. The village guard system was established by the state in 1985 (Law on Villages, Law No.
3162; Law No. 442). Law No. 442 asked for the establishment of the village guard
system “to protect the integrity, life and property of everybody.” It was composed of
around 60,000 civilian pro-government Kurdish militias guarding against the PKK in the
conflict-affected regions. See also various newsletters available on the Göç-Der website,
available at www.gocder.com.
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One of the criticisms Turkey received from the European Commission
over the years was that it did not provide the necessary legal and economic
infrastructure to facilitate IDPs’ return migration to the conflict-affected
areas in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. Attempts such as the 2003 Law
on Integration to Society and the Return to Village and Rehabilitation
Program initiated by the government did not bear significant results.
Following European Union’s criticisms, in Spring 2001, the government
submitted to the cabinet a bill on compensation for harm caused by acts of
terrorist organizations and from measures taken by the state in the struggle
against terror.107 The bill aimed to provide compensation on the basis of
assessments by multilateral commissions, composed of deputy governors,
government civil servants, and members of the bar association. The law,
which was approved on 17 July 2004, has still not been implemented.
However, even in the way the law was set up, many NGOs directed their
criticisms to the law’s lack of comprehensiveness (due to the restrictions it
set on who can receive compensation) and possible problems in implemen-
tation.108 Yet, on the other hand, in his visit to Turkey, Walter Kalin,
Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the Human Rights of
Internally Displaced Persons, expressed his satisfaction with the willingness
shown by interlocutors to approach the problem with an open mind. Even
though noting several areas where improvements are needed (e.g. the high
rejection rate of applicants, falling behind scheduled time framework) and
suggesting an extension of the application date for compensation, Kalin
underlined the importance of waiting for the strategy document the
government will finish soon.109 Previous efforts initiated by the government
could only lead the return of around 124,218 IDPs to their homes.110
Turkey’s efforts to join the European Union bore eight sets of reform
packages, through which the Grand National Assembly actualized a total of
261 new laws between October 2003 and July 2004.111 In several areas,
including freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of
107. Law on Compensation for Damage Arising From Terror and Combating Terror, Law No.
5233, in Official Gazette No. 25535 (17 July 2004), put in force 4 October 2004.
108. Deniz Yu…kseker, Latest Situation in the Problem of Internal Displacement in Diyarbakır:
Problems Arising from Internal Displacement and Implementation of Law No: 5233
(Feb. 2005) (unpublished working paper presented in TESEV’s Working Group on
Internal Displacement).
109. Press Release, United Nations Development Programme, Representative of the UN
Secretary General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons Sees New Hope
for the Internally Displaced Persons in Turkey (9 May 2005), available at www.undp.org.tr/
PressRelease_9may05.asp.
110. Commission of the European Communities, 2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress
Towards Accession, COM(2004)656 final at 51, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
enlargement/report_2004/pdf/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf.
111. Id. at 20.
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religion, and legislative organs (such as in the judicial system), major
changes took place on paper. However, considering that most laws have
been approved but have not been put into practice and that previous
regulations, such as the State of Emergency practiced in Eastern and
Southeastern Anatolia, have left a bitter legacy, one must be cautious of the
possible outcomes.112
VI. THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN FURTHERING
THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE
Using Turkey as a case study addresses the conceptual issue of international
pressure changing a state’s internal behavior on sensitive issues. However,
answering the question as to what extent these pressures can shift state
policies to comply with international human rights standards still requires
elaboration. Local, regional, and international organizations have recently
started to argue that if states deliberately displace their populations, subject
them to starvation, and fail to protect them from abuse, these states should
be held accountable. Furthermore, in cases in which these states are
incapable of providing basic human rights during and after the displace-
ment, regional and international organizations should gain access for
humanitarian relief. In either situation, new international understanding
emphasizes that there should be limits to sovereignty. Transnational actors
are constantly challenging state sovereignty in the area of human rights:
directly through guiding principles, monitoring mechanisms, and member-
ship conditions; and indirectly through pressuring them to sign treaties that
guarantee the civil, political, and cultural rights of minorities if the majority
of the affected population is an ethnic minority within that state.
Turkey is one of these countries, feeling the effects of increasing
international and regional pressures on its policies toward its Kurdish
population. During most of the 1990s, the government became caught in
the nexus of its domestic and foreign policies. On one hand, Turkey’s
domestic policies toward the Kurds and the internally displaced created a
serious domestic crisis that the government considered exclusively an
internal matter. On the other hand, Turkey’s bid for membership in the EU
opened its internal policies to severe criticism from the EU members and to
demands for change before Turkish membership can be achieved. Pressure
mounted on the Turkish government to change its policies toward the Kurds
112. Dilek Kurban, Note, Confronting Equality: The Need for Constitutional Protection of
Minorities on Turkey’s Path to the European Union, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 151, 195
(2003).
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from both the Council of Europe and the conditions established for the EU
membership.
While the Turkish state started to reevaluate its past position on the issue
and passed laws that would make return and resettlement easier, returnees
still inform organizations about the problems they encounter. International
and regional organizations monitoring the internal displacement have
recently reported positive developments and attitudinal changes by state
officials. Moreover, with the economic aid received from regional organiza-
tions and other groups, the Turkish government appears to be making efforts
to build an environment conducive to allowing IDPs to return to their
homelands.
Turkey’s efforts to resolve the Kurdish Question and other concerns
about minority rights and problems in internal displacement reveal an
ambition for membership in the EU that is actualized more in signing
treaties than in putting new legislation in effect. Further, this “ratification
gap” puts Turkey into the category of states with challenges to changing
human rights understanding. On the other hand, in Sikkink’s continuum of
acceptance of human rights norms, increasing international and regional
pressures have recently shifted Turkey from the category of “refusal” to
“more cooperation.” According to Sikkink “[t]he passage from denial to lip
service may seem insignificant but suggests an important shift in the shared
understandings of states that make certain justifications no longer acceptable.”113
Similarly, in Jordan’s categorization, Turkey moved from low-compliance
to the upper categories. The most obvious evidence of this came on 22 June
2004, when PACE decided to remove Turkey from its monitoring process
with a majority of the votes (141 of 153 votes).
VII. CONCLUSION
Globalization has assured the world that no state exists in a political
vacuum. International political, economic, and cultural forces tremen-
dously influence the actions and policies of states. However, the extent of
that influence may vary over time and between issues, particularly if such
issues pose a serious challenge to a state’s sovereignty.
States can face pressures from the international community from time to
time in varying degrees. This article has argued that in some cases pressures
from regional and international organizations can help shape the under-
standing and policies of states, even in matters the states wish to keep
private. Through mechanisms such as political conditionality for member-
113. Sikkink, supra note 8, at 415.
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ship to regional organizations and condemnation by member states of those
organizations, states have begun to feel these external pressures more and
more. When a domestic issue falls in the scope of international affairs
through new understanding and reconceptualization, innovative pressure,
monitoring, and compliance mechanisms emerge. Sikkink argues that “[i]n
the realm of human rights, it is the combination of moral pressure and
material pressure that leads to change”114 that can shift an internal matter to
the focus of the international community. Of course, the extent to which
these mechanisms are successful depends on different factors. Among these
factors, membership conditionality is the most effective in the countries that
Jordan labels “medium compliance” countries and, to a certain extent, in
the “low compliance” countries in which Turkey was placed in for a long
time.115 Now that we can consider Turkey in the “medium compliance”
category, the pressures might bear more fruitful outcomes. Yet, at the same
time, one must take into account the fact that implementation of these new
laws will be as important as passing them.
This article has studied Turkey’s efforts to join the European Community
and the latter’s effects on Turkey’s human rights practices toward its Kurdish
population in general and toward the internally displaced Kurds specifically.
Undertaking this case study was an attempt to analyze how modifying the
attitudes and practices of a state with regard to international human rights
pressures challenges state sovereignty, even in matters states regard as
domestic. In the Turkish context, the humiliation of failing to obtain a
starting date for accession negotiations served as a moral pressure, and a
political conditionality for membership for the EU played a significant role
as a material challenge for Turkey’s ongoing human rights understanding.
The acceptance of the power of the European Court of Human Rights of the
Council of Europe inserted material pressures upon Turkey for a more
positive approach to human rights policies on Kurdish IDPs. However, the
dual humiliation and material pressures do not invalidate the fact that all
states retain the power to decide what policies can be changed and what
international norms can be declined. It is only the scope and limits of state
sovereignty that can be open to change over the years, not a removal of this
power.
114. Id. at 437.
115. Jordan, supra note 1.
